ACDI/CIDA
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Lucerne presentation, Lysoen network
11 May 2000
Professor Keith Krause
Graduate Institute of International Studies
thank you for the invitation, and opportunity to participate in this discussion - hope that this sort of consultation becomes a hallmark of the Lysoen network meetings
in the interests of time, I have organized my comments around four brief points, each of which touches upon the theme of this session. Not all of them directly address the 2001 UN conference and its International Action Plan, but most of them do indirectly
naturally, I will be happy to answer any questions you may have, or expand upon any points that are unclear, in the discussion, or after the session
Keeping Human Security in View
my first point could be called "Keeping Human Security in View," and it concerns the overall focus of the International Action plan
much of the discussion so far has focused on aspects of the small arms and light weapons problem that deal with the illicit dimension of the trade - which is of course the mandate of the conference
I think prospect are good progress towards legally-binding measures in the area of brokers and traffickers
that there is an emerging consensus around some common standards for marking and tracing and record-keeping
in the politically-binding basket, I would advocate a proposal restricting or forbidding transfers to non-state actors
although I do not think it will survive the final process, I do think it should be put on the table
finally: a strong commitment to transparency would be desirable, both of trade and production and stockpiling of weapons, since this is a key element of separating the illicit from the legal trade
and this should go beyond government information exchanges
However: none of these explicitly focus on the human security dimension: and all concentrate on the "arms control dimension"
I should also add that only the first point in the draft Chairman's summary dealing with small arms actually deals with human security issues
even if the 2001 conference were to do all four of the things I have just mentioned
this would not provide "freedom from fear" and improve the security of people and communities, or reduce the number of people who are dying from the use of small arms
I think when evaluating proposals for the 2001 conference, we should ask:
will this measure improve the security of people and communities from the threat of force and violence?
we should not measure success by the number of weapons that have been collected, by the robustness of governments' export control or firearms legislation, by the transparency of the trade in small arms, or by the extensiveness of Codes of Conduct. These are all only means to an end.
we should measure success by such questions as: are weapons fuelling conflicts, is the climate of fear and violence improving, are weapons widely used to intimidate or injure, and do they have a negative impact on political, economic and social life?
achieving these goals will require much greater commitment to concrete preventive and post-conflict measures
at minimum: in order to keep human security clearly in view in the 2001 conference, I think the Lysoen network should
push for the International Action plan to contain explicit reference to two other politically-binding commitments
first: no transfers to states that consistently violate or fail to protect the human rights of their citizens
second: declare and destroy surplus weapons stocks, especially those created after downsizing or restructuring of national forces
Leading by Doing
my second point can be called "leading by doing"
in addition to coordinating their positions, and pursuing a common position on some issues
I think the Lysoen network could lead by example in several of the areas mentioned above
a public commitment to tighten up domestic legislation on brokering activities, for example (if it is weak), to the highest possible standards, would be helpful, providing examples of how this can be done
we do not want the debate to be dominated by proposals of one or two, especially Northern, states
a second measure could be a public commitment to domestic transparency on small arms and light weapons issues
through the publication of a report providing details of arms exports and imports, including small arms and light weapons, with the greatest amount of information consistent with national security concerns
I know that many states here already participate in the UN register, and that there have been some discussions in Asia and OSCE of the prospects for a regional instrument on small arms and light weapons
I want to underline that transparency is also a domestic political imperative - and a cornerstone of democratic accountability
so Lysoen states should undertake to improve their domestic transparency and accountability in a broad range of security matters, not just in small arms and light weapons
related to this: third measure: declaration of stocks, and surplus stocks of weapons, with a commitment to destroy these weapons
and justification of how weapons holdings are appropriate for the national military strategy and security policy of the state
without this - all discussions of "surplus" stocks will probably be futile
Life after 2001
there is a strong possibility that the 2001 conference will fail to achieve anything concrete, especially at the level of legally-binding commitments
I also do not yet see the outlines of a consensus around strong politically-binding commitments, although I am confident that some will emerge
so I think one role the Lysoen network could play is in preparing the ground for the post-2001 period, beyond the actual content of the International Action Plan
here the important thing will be to identify a strong "coalition of the willing" -- perhaps 30-50 states - that are committed to undertaking concrete and strong action over the next few years on this issue
in order to do this -- states should not sacrifice too much to achieving a broad consensus, if the result is that the measures that are proposed fail to address the problem in a meaningful way
I think we all realize that the problem of small arms will not be solved in two or three years - and that it will be with us for some time to come
so Lysoen network should act to ensure that if the 2001 conference does not achieve concrete results, we can move forward on different fronts
Instruments and Institutions of Violence
my final point concerns the broader context of efforts to combat small arms and light weapons proliferation
we all understand that small arms and light weapons are only one part of the problem, since violent conflicts and insecurities have many deeper causes
weapons are the instruments: they do not themselves fight the wars, commit the crimes, or destroy communities - people do, usually when they are organized into armed groups
of course, we should not ignore the weapons: since easy and cheap access to large quantities of military-style weapons is one of the things that pushes "ordinary" conflicts to high levels of violence
the headlines in Sierra Leone of the past week should remind us of this
but I do think we need to accompany our efforts on small arms and light weapons -- the instruments of violence -- with attention to the institutions of organized violence -- to the role of security institutions in states and societies
this is touched upon in the first point of the draft chairman's report, and I think it should have greater emphasis
there is a paradox here: human security is about removing violence and the threat of force from political, social and economic life, both within and between communities
but in order to keep violence at bay, modern states have created enormously powerful institutions -- armies, police forces, security services -- that are supposed to monopolize the instruments of force, and prevent violence from "leaking into" politics and society
yet when we look around us, it is clear that these same institutions, when they are not held in check by democratic institutions, or balanced by a strong and independent civil society
often pose the greatest threat to human security
so: as both a preventive and a post-conflict measure, the Lysoen network should tackle seriously the issue of security-sector reform: the entire gamut of relations between armed forces, security institutions, the state and civil society
if we do not focus on reforming the institutions, and well as controlling the instruments, of force and violence,
all the efforts to control the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons "in all its aspects" may not actually improve the security of people and communities in different parts of the world
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